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Islam and colonialism had reconfigured Somali history since its peo-
ple’s conversion to Islam in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. 
As a result, Somalis adopted a new identity and culture by embrac-
ing a patrilineal genealogy, new customary law (Xeer), consultative 
governance, and collective leadership.1 Also, Somali people had 
established multiple states in the Middle Ages, connected with the 
Muslim Empires, applied Sharia blended with local customs, defended 
their territory from foreign invaders, and spread Islam in the Horn of 
Africa. On the other hand, multiple colonial powers seized the Somali 
Peninsula during the European scramble for Africa, which coincided 
with the fragmentation of Somali states into smaller clan-based and 
city-states.2 These colonial powers introduced the European model 
of governance, secular legal system, the market economy, and new 
culture. Nonetheless, they had failed to refashion the belief system of 
the Somalis because of the vigorous resistance under the leadership of 
Sufi scholars of Islam. This resistance took an armed form of resistance 
mainly in the pastoral regions and peaceful defiance in the agricultural 
and settled communities.3 The Somali elites who inherited the post-co-
lonial state in 1960 maintained the European model of governance and 
political system by adopting liberal democracy in the first nine years 
(1960-1969). After that, however, the system was abused extensively, 
instigating political violence in the election of 1969 that led to the 
assassination of President Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke and the military 
coup d’état that imposed a dictatorial rule for 21 years (1969-1991).
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The fundamental doctrine of the Somali ruling elites was strength-
ening nationalism (modernization) and weakening tradition (Islam 
and clan system), imagining that this strategy realizes national unity 
and promotes national development.4 However, the deep-rooted 
Somali tradition resisted resolutely and fought back in violent identity 
politics and Islamist movements, which ignited even more societal 
fragmentations.5 The conflict of modernity and tradition reached its 
height in the 1980s and culminated in the final defeat of modernity 
(state) in 1991. Hence, the vacuum left behind by the state was filled 
by clan warlords and Islamists. In this circumstance, Islam and the 
clan were used as the only available instruments in restoring rudimen-
tary administrations in Somaliland, Puntland, and the federal state of 
Somalia.6 The final setback to Somali nationalism occurred when the 
clan factor triumphed at the Somali Peace and Reconciliation Con-
ference in Djibouti in 2000, and clan power-sharing of 4.5 formula 
was adopted.7 Also, the success of the Islamists’ project exhibited in 
depositing Islam the ultimate reference for all laws and prohibiting to 
disseminate other religions in Somalia.8  What is more, the role of Isla-
mists in politics has strengthened since 2000, and the Somali political 
landscape has entirely transmuted, placing Islamists as the ruling elites 
and the armed oppositions.
Indeed, the cosmology of Somali society is obsessed with two con-
tradictory convictions: clan particularism and Islamic universalism. 
Clan particularism often induces communities to prejudice and paro-
chialism, while Islam, unless given an extremist interpretation, calls 
for peace, brotherhood, and tolerance.9 The dominant perspective 
of Somali studies highlights clan particularism and offers a clannish 
interpretation of history and politics. Conversely, Islamic universal-
ism and Islamic-inspired movements were not given enough academic 
attention unless perceived as a threat to the Western powers. This 
predilection was evident from the literature produced on the Somali 
Darwish movement (1900-1920) and after the 9/11 Global War on ter-
rorism.10 Since then, most scholarly studies focus on Islam and Isla-
mist movements as part of global security studies. However, doctrinal 
controversies within Islamist movements and traditional Sufi Orders 
received less attention.  
Thus, this essay attempts to answer the frequently asked question of 
what the difference between various Islamists is since they all call for 
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the application of Sharia. It explores the various conceptions of Islam 
espoused by Sufi Orders, Salafia groups, and Muslim brotherhood. 
Initially, it introduces Sufi Orders and genealogy of Islam followed by 
the Somali society. Then, the essay provides a brief background of the 
Muslim brotherhood and Salafia groups, exposing their consensus and 
controversy with the Sufi conception of Islam. Moreover, it brings forth 
the controversy between Muslim Brotherhood and Salafia groups. 
Finally, the essay concludes with a typology of the three Islamic per-
suasions and their relations to the schools of theology, jurisprudence, 
and Sufism to unveil their consensus and controversy.  
II. Notes on the Terminologies
Various exonymic or endonymic terminologies developed to charac-
terize Islamic-inspired socio-political activism require revisiting. The 
logic of the exonymic terminologies emanates from the Orientalist 
scholars and sociologist of religion which does not mind the validity of 
religious beliefs but studies its effects on societies. According to Martin 
Kramer, “debate over terminology has always surrounded the West’s 
relations with Islam, and its outcome has been as much a barometer of 
the West’s needs as a description of the actual state of Islam.”11 Thus, 
scholars in the Western Accademia and media, in general, examined 
the core ideology of Islamic-inspired activism within their ethnocen-
tric lenses and correlated the actions of Muslims to the religion of 
Islam.12 These scholars also studied Islam from a comparative perspec-
tive with Christianity and coined terminologies accordingly. Examples 
of such terminologies are Islamic fundamentalism, Islamic fanatism, 
Islamic radicalism, and Islamic extremism.13 The use of these terminol-
ogies reinforces negative stereotypes and prejudices against Muslims.14 
Moreover, other terminologies were coined from the labels of minority 
Muslim groups such as militant Islam, revolutionary Islam, Islamic ter-
rorism, etc. Likewise, proponents of the Islamic-inspired movements 
associate their activities with Islam. They brand their movements with 
terminologies such as Islamic reawakening, Islamic revival, Islamic 
movements, Islamic State, Islamic resurgence, etc.  Therefore, both 
opponents and proponents share in associating Islam with human 
actions, yet for different rationalization.15   
The basic argument of this essay is to distinguish Islam from the 
behaviors of its believers. It means that the deeds of Muslims as 
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human beings may or may not conform to the Islamic principles and 
value system. Therefore, branding Islamic-inspired activism as wholly 
Islamic, whether it stems from misunderstanding, bad intentions, or 
good intentions, distorts the image of Islam and its transcendental 
meaning. Accordingly, terminologies such as traditional Islam, popu-
lar Islam, and American Islam are refuted. Equally, the above-stated 
exonymic terminologies used in the Western Academia and media are 
also repudiated. On the other hand, the endonymic use of Islamic-in-
spired movements in describing their activities as “Islamic” is also dis-
proved. In our perspective, Islam is the transcendental religion with the 
primary sources in the Qur’an and Hadith. Its explanation by experts 
of Islamic sciences may offer various theological and jurisprudential 
variants.16 Indeed, the religion of Islam allows and tolerates various 
interpretations within the borders of its core principles through what 
is called ‘Ijtihad.’  Thus, Islam and its practice in the various societies 
with different cultures may manifest slightly differently in its practical 
applications. 
This essay will use the following terminologies to avoid confu-
sion. Islamic is a generic term used to signify anything related to the 
Islamic religion. For example, Islamic education, Islamic belief, Islamic 
manners, Islamic laws, etc. It refutes the use of terminologies like 
Islamic history, Islamic civilization, Islamic arts, etc. Our perspective 
proposes the use of Muslim history, Muslim civilization, Muslim arts, 
etc. Islamists (Activists) are devoted individuals or organized groups 
(movements) who assertively promote Islamic teachings in society and 
advocate for applying Islamic principles at the society and state levels. 
Islamists are not monolithic and range from moderate reformists and 
extremist revolutionaries. They differ in their objectives, approaches, 
understanding of Islam, and relations with non-Muslims and other 
religious traditions. Non-Islamists (non-activists) are the majority of 
Muslims who may or may not be devoted to Islam. They share the 
common characteristic of not advocating for the application of Islam 
in the society and the state but not necessarily opposing it. They are 
different from the secular minority, who are primarily educated in 
Western academia. Indeed, Islamists and secularists are minorities 
among Muslims but more vocal and organized. The above definitions: 
Islamists and non-Islamists accord the Islamic perspective on classify-
ing Muslims into three groups.17 Finally, Islamism will be used as the 
ideology of the popular socio-political movements advocating for the 
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reordering of Muslim societies and states following the principles of 
Islam.
III. Brief History of the Somali Sufi Orders
The advent of Sufism in Somalia has been recorded since the early 
fifteenth century with the arrival of 44 Islamic scholars under Sheikh 
Ibrahim Abu-Zarbai in 1430. It was also reported that Sheikh Jamal al- 
Addn bin Yusuf al-Zayli (d. 1389), the author of the famous book Nasbu 
al-Raya li Ahadith al-Hidayah, was one of the Sufi Sheikhs in Soma-
lia. However, this report remains speculative since there are no more 
accounts of it.18Nevertheless, the renewal and reform of Sufi Orders 
as an organized movement were noted since the mid-nineteenth cen-
tury to the middle of the twentieth century (1850-1950).19 Indeed, Said 
Sheikh Samatar compressed this period to 40 years instead of 100 
years. He wrote, ‘These years between 1880 and 1920 can be described 
as the era of the Sheikhs in Somali history.”20 Revival is an essential 
dimension of the historical experience of Muslims; Sufi reformation 
entailed shifting from individual Islamic activities to institutionalized 
orders.21 Traditional Sufi Orders have taken mainly peaceful 
approaches to socio-religious reform through Islamic propagation 
and spiritual revitalization.22 They dominated religious life, reaching 
out to populations in the urban and rural areas alike, most of whom 
had identified with one of the Sufi Orders by the nineteenth century. 
Besides their complementary role in running community affairs, Sufi 
scholars established Islamic centers, whose dwellers gave their alle-
giance only to their Sufi masters/Sheikhs.23 Moreover, in contradiction 
to conventional historiography that considers Sufi Orders to be mainly 
apolitical, many leaders of the Sufi Orders and their disciples became 
the supreme leaders of their communities. In this way, clan allegiances 
and loyalties were diluted and at times transformed into ideological 
loyalties.
Although Sufism existed and was practiced since early Islamic his-
tory, most organized brotherhoods emerged in the eleventh, twelfth, 
and thirteenth centuries. For instance, the most popular Sufi Orders 
such as Qadiriyah were founded by Sheikh Abdulqadir al-Jeylani 
(1077-1166); Rufaiyah by Sayid Ahmed al-Rufai (1118-1182); and Sha-
daliyah by Abul-Hassan al-Shadali (1196-1258). In the nineteenth cen-
tury, the Muslim World was experiencing reform and revival of the 
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Islamic call associated with the emergence of the new revivalist move-
ments, reorientation, and renaissance of the Sufi Orders. In Somalia, 
as part of this reform and revival, its scholars of Islam initiated an 
inventive and sustainable system of education, using effective tech-
niques to educate the population. There are two main Sufi orders in 
Somalia: Qadiriyah and Ahmadiyah, and each of them have its local 
offshoots.24 For example, Qadiriyah has two branches: Zayliyah and 
Uweysiyah. Zayliyah was founded by Sheikh Abdirahman al-Zayli 
(1815-1882) and headquartered in Qulunqul near Dhagahbur in the 
Somali State of Ethiopia. Also, Uweysiyah was founded by the spiri-
tual master Sheikh Aweys ibn Ahmad al-Barawi (1846-1907), and its 
seat was located in Balad al-Amin near Afgoye, 40 km south of Mog-
adishu. On the other hand, Ahmadiyah has three offshoots in Soma-
lia: Rahmaniyah, Salihiyah, and Dandarawiyah. Rahmaniyah was 
founded by Maulana Abdurahman ibn Mohamud (d. 1874). Moreover, 
Salihiyah has two branches: the southern branch introduced by Sheikh 
Mohamad Guled al-Rashidi (d.1918) and the northern branch by Sayid 
Mohamed Abdulle Hassan (1856-1920). Furthermore, Dandarawiyah 
was introduced by Sayid Adan Ahmad and had a limited following in 
northern Somalia.25 
Sufi Orders have been weakened with the emergence of the Islamist 
movements in the 1960s. However, it was transformed in reaction to 
their interaction with Salafism and, in particular, with Al-Shabaab. In 
particular, Ahal-Sunna Wa Al-Jama became a symbol of Sufi militancy 
to encounter Al-Shabaab.26 Otherwise, transformed Sufi Orders estab-
lished charity institutions, modern schools, and universities. The new 
generation of Sufi Orders in Somalia are more educated and being inte-
grated with modern institutions. One example of such Sufi Order affili-
ated institution is Moallim Noor Foundation which runs Imam al-Shafi 
University and many schools, besides other traditional Sufi activities 
such as Qur’anic schools and building mosques.27  
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Table 1. Somali Sufi Orders, Founders and their Center of operations
IV. The Genealogy of Traditional Conception of Islam  
Traditional Islam in Somalia follows three main genealogies: the 
Ashariyah theology, Shafi jurisprudence, and Sufism. The Ashari-
yah theology was founded by Abu al-Hassan Al-Ashari (873-935) in 
reaction to the extreme rationalism espoused by the school of Mu’tazi-
lah. In developing its defense mechanism, the Ashariyah school 
employed the method of Tawil, meaning interpreting some of the attri-
butes of Allah. The Ashari theology and methodology were accepted 
as the standard for mainstream Sunni theology by most of the Sunni 
scholarly community.
This theology is based on seeking to defend Islam from excessive 
literalism and extreme rationalism, retaining Islam’s middle and 
moderate way. Examples of the most contentious issues of the debate 
are how to understand the divine attributes and consign meaning to 
Allah. The position of the Ashari theology was to validate whatever 
attributes Allah has affirmed for Himself and negate what Allah has 
negated for himself, which is any resemblance between the Creator 
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and creation. This concept is bluntly affirmed in the Qur’anic verse, 
“There is absolutely nothing like unto Him.”
However, to avoid such similitude, Asharites interpret metaphor-
ically some attributes of Allah, which may appear to the public as a 
similitude to the humans, such as: “His face,” “His hand,” “Seeing,” and 
“Hearing “ which repeatedly appears in the Quranic verses. Among 
the most prominent scholars of Asharites is the famous scholar 
Abu-Hamid al-Ghazali (1058-1111), who articulated moderate Sufism 
in combination with al-Ashariyah theology. 
The Shafiyah School of jurisprudence is one of the four major Sunni 
schools rooted in the methodology and teachings of Abu Abdallah 
al-Shafi (767–820). He was a student of Malik ibn Anas (d.795), the Ma-
likiyah School of jurisprudence founder. Al-Shafi is famous for his 
development of the science of Figh in his illustrious book al-Risalah, in 
which he laid the foundation of Usul al-fiqh (sources of jurisprudence): 
the Qur’an, the Sunnah, Qiyas (analogy), and Ijma (scholarly consen-
sus). With his systematization of Sharia, al-Shafi provided a frame-
work for deducing Islamic laws that permit independent and locally 
based legal systems. The four Sunni legal schools kept within the gen-
eral framework and methodology that Shafi initiated. The traditional 
conception of Islam in Somalia adheres to the Shafi school introduced 
through its connection with Yemen. 
 
Sufism appeared as a reaction against the luxurious lifestyle that 
grew prevalent in the Islamic urban centers when Muslims became 
powerful and wealthy and came under the influence of other cul-
tures. Its roots are argued to be linked to the practices of the Prophet 
Muhammad and early generations of the companions and followers. 
However, its systematization into organized brotherhoods appeared 
in the eleventh century. Abu Hamed al- Ghazali (1058–1111) is consid-
ered the scholar who best succeeded in combining Sufism and Islamic 
jurisprudence in his works, where he argued that Sufism originated 
from the Qur’an was compatible with Islamic thought. In Somalia, 
Sufi Orders have long been the most important form of religious iden-
tification in the country. Sufism in Somalia belongs to the moderate 
Sufis rooted in al-Ghazali ‘s way, and it had a significant missionary 
impact throughout Somalia. Its tremendous influence is exercised 
through its two main brotherhoods: Qadiriyah and Ahmadiyah.
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Therefore, the traditional conception of Islam espouses taqlid (im-
itation) and strictly follows three genealogies. In doing so, it resists 
change and upholds its historical heritage in the globalized world. In 
addition, these three genealogies are perpetuated through traditional 
Islamic institutions comprising educational establishments and Sufi 
order’s centers where the master-disciple intimate relationship is 
strictly nurtured.
This relationship is the core foundation of Sufism, preserved 
through various social functions. The most important functions are 
Mawliidka (commemoration of the Prophet’s birthday), Xuska (offer-
ing alms to the souls of the deceased parents), and Siyaaro (paying 
homage to respected teachers and visiting their tombs). In a nutshell, 
the nature of the traditional conception of Islam is adhered to by the 
overwhelming majority of Somalis. Traditional establishments repre-
sented mainly by the Sufi orders do not carry any particular political 
agenda, and reform programs focus mainly on ritualistic and spiritu-
al-religious practices.
Figure 1. The Traditional Conception of Islam in Somalia
V. Salafia versus Traditional Conceptions of Islam.  
The terminology of Salafia is highly contentious and used differently 
by various schools and scholars. As a general rule, Muslim scholars 
accept to follow the understanding and methodology used to interpret 
Islam by the first three generations of scholars and look to them as 
their role models. In this sense, all Muslims cherish and adore Salaf-
ism; however, many groups claim to belong to a particular school of 
Salafia. Detractors of this school call them Wahabiyah, linking them 
to the teachings of Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab (1703- 1792), an 
Islamic scholar highly popular in Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf 
Ashariyah Theologuy Shafiyah Jurisprudence
Sufism  
(Qadiriyah/Ahmadiyah
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States. Sometimes, they also call themselves people of Hadith (Ahl al-
Hadith) interchangeably with Salafism. However, “all Wahabis are 
Salafists, but not all Salafists are Wahabis.” The methodology of this 
school stands entirely in opposition to the traditional conception of 
Islam and rejects taqlid (imitation), claiming to follow directly the 
Quran and the Sunnah of the Prophet Muhammad. Its adherents 
identify the bid’a (innovations in Islamic practices) introduced to Islam 
as the primary impediment that caused the decadence of the Muslim 
civilization. Therefore, in placing principal importance on preaching 
idealized Tawhid (monotheism), they emphasize their criticism of 
traditional Muslim practices as innovations and shirk (polytheism). 
The theology of Salafia is based on the refutation of any Tawil (figura-
tive interpretation) of the attributes of Allah, advocating the belief in 
these attributes instead of as they appear in the Qur ‘an and Prophetic 
traditions, without asking how, a principle known as bila kayf (accep-
tance without further inquiry). The most crucial difference between 
the Asharites and the Salafia is the permissibility and refutation of 
interpreting divine attributes. 
Salafism was introduced to Somalia as part of the rising influence 
of Saudi Arabia in global politics. In the 1960s, the Saudis worked in 
partnership with all Islamist groups, created pertinent institutions to 
promote Islam, and advocated a joint Islamic stand against growing 
Communism and secular Arab nationalism in the 1960s. However, 
since the late 1970s, after the triumph of the Iranian Revolution and 
the perceived threat of a similar development in other parts of the 
Muslim world, Saudi Arabia revised its policy; it eschewed Islamism 
and local political Islamic activism. In Somalia, due to its being part of 
the Saudi geopolitical sphere, the influence of Wahabism was no-
ticeably augmented through students educated in the Saudi Islamic 
universities and through Somali migrant labor during the economic 
boom of the 1970s. These students were taught the thinking of Sheikh 
Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab and copied his hostile approach 
to the Sufi Brotherhoods in Arabia. Moreover, they have also intro-
duced some aspects of Hanbali jurisprudence, mixing it with other 
jurisprudences under the pretext of not following a specific school 
of jurisprudence. Furthermore, they consider their principal duty to 
spread al-Aqidah al-Sahihah (the correct theology), which eventually 
puts them on the collision course with society’s Islamic belief system 
and practices. Indeed, Salafia believes that their theology is the only 
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right one because it is the theology of the first three generations of 
Muslims, from where they draw their name, al-Salafiyah (followers of 
the early pious generations of Muslims). This mode of thinking breeds 
religious intolerance and community conflict and promotes bigotry 
and extremism.
Moreover, having been educated in Saudi Arabia, many students 
were employed after their graduation by various Saudi institutions to 
preach the “the right theology” (Salafia) in Somalia. It is worth noting 
that Salafia considers Sufism a dangerous heresy and consider their 
duty to engage in a campaign against the adherents of Sufism.  In 
that approach, Salafia is not simply a reform movement but a militant 
approach that aims to change the traditional conception of Islam as 
practiced in Somalia. Salafia tendencies in Somalia are fragmented into 
four groups: academic Salafia (Salafīyah al- ilmiyah), political Salafia 
(Salafiyah al-Harakiyah), Jihadi Salafia (Salafīyah al-Jihadiyah), and new 
Salafism (Salafīyah al-Jadidah (La-jama). However, these groups are in 
harmony with each other to confront Sufi Orders, and that conflict, at 
times, escalates to the point that these schools of thought render each 
other as infidels. The extremity of this conflict is evident in the Al-
Shabaab’s destruction and desecration of the tombs of prominent Sufi 
scholars in Somalia 
VI. The Muslim Brotherhood versus 
Traditional Conception of Islam 
The Muslim Brotherhood (MB) was founded in 1928 by Hasan al-Ban-
na in Egypt and reached Somalia in 1953 through Egyptian teachers 
and then via Somali students who graduated from the Arab univer-
sities. MB thought has inspired many Islamist organizations and 
individuals in Somalia; however, Islah Movement is the organization 
that represents its international network. The MB stands in the mid-
dle of the two orientations: traditional Islam and neo-Salafism. Hasan 
al-Banna postulated in the treatise of ‘Al-Aqaid’ (Creed) the following 
moderate position on the disputed Islamic creed.
We believe that the position of the Salaf, which was to re-
frain from inquiring into the meanings of Allah’s attributes 
and leave the explanation of their meanings to Allah (SWT), is 
safer and should be followed in order to avoid problems re-
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sulting from metaphorical interpretation on the one hand and 
the nullification of Allah’s attributes on the other. … On the 
other hand, we believe that the metaphorical interpretations of 
the Khalaf [Asharites] do not sanction any judgment on them 
as having gone outside Islam or to have strayed from the right 
path, nor do they justify that long dispute between them and 
others past and present, because Islam is vast and comprehen-
sive enough to accommodate all of them.
Moreover, the MB, promoting Muslim unity among various groups, 
adopted the slogan, “We should unite upon that which we agree, and 
excuse each other in that which we disagree.” The tolerance of the 
MB emanates from its worldwide program based on the reform of all 
Muslim societies that adhere to different schools of jurisprudence, the-
ologies, and various forms of Sufism. Hasan al-Banna, who belonged 
in his early years to Hasafiyah Sufi Brotherhood, wrote that differences 
in matters of Islamic Jurisprudence should not cause division, con-
tention, or hatred within the ranks of the Muslims. In that context, 
followers of the MB methodology avoid divisive Islamic discourses 
on doctrinal matters and legal aspects within its society. Being open to 
diverse Islamic theology and practices, they tolerate different theo-
logical views on Islam and despise rigid obsession with nuances of 
the religious doctrine. They believe that Sufism and other tradition-
al practices should be accommodated and that the focus in Islamic 
activism should be directed toward social and political issues rather 
than theological quibbling that divides Muslim communities. Accord-
ingly, MB does not oppose Ashari theology, Shafi jurisprudence, and 
Sufism, constituting the basic components of the traditional concep-
tion of Islam in Somalia. However, the MB does not hesitate to cleanse 
practices that contravene Islamic principles in the society through an 
educational process that does not ruin community cohesion. Indeed, 
its main agenda is to create an atmosphere of collaboration between 
various Islamic groups and organizations for the advantage of the 
bigger goals – the promotion of Islam in society and its application at 
the state level. In short, besides hostile relations with the traditional 
conception of Islam, followers of the Salafia School, believing in ex-
clusivity and absolutism of interpreting Islam, are also in conflict with 
the MB on several issues.
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VII. Salafia versus Muslim Brotherhood
Salafia adherents accuse the MB of accepting Ashariyah theology and 
tolerating bida (innovations). They also criticize the MB for accepting 
selective elements of Western modernity, such as the democratic 
process and women’s political participation. Moreover, Salafia con-
demns the ambitious goal of the MB, which is based on “unity in 
diversity” among Muslims, many of whom are allegedly enmeshed in 
innovations. On the other hand, the MB also carefully criticizes Salaf-
ism in many aspects. For instance, they criticize them for their literalist 
interpretation of Islam and conflictual approach to other Islamist ac-
tivists. Moreover, the MB frowns upon the apolitical attitude of the ac-
ademic Salafism and their acquiescent attitude toward oppressive re-
gimes. MB accuses the Salafis that they tolerate what could be termed 
‘Shirk al-Qusur’ (polytheism of the ruling place) and focus on the ‘Shirk 
al-Qubur’ (the polytheism of graveyards). This notion is that they do 
not confront polytheism and deviation of the ruling class while they 
focus on the simple deviations from Islam, such as Sufi visitations to 
the graveyards of the saints and seeking their blessing. Furthermore, 
the MB adherents criticize Jihadi Salafism for aborting the peaceful 
transformation of the Muslim society and inciting devastating civil 
wars. Considering Salafia as an extremist group, the MB accuses them 
of causing more harm than good to the Islamic reformism and tar-
nishing the global image of Islam and Muslims. The following table 
indicates the dynamics of the three persuasions in Somalia.
Figure 2. Islamic Conceptions of the three Persuasions in Somalia
Muslim Brotherhood
Sufi Orders Salafia/Wahabiyah
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VIII. Conclusion
The conception of Islam in Somalia was founded on Ashariyah the-
ology, Al-Shafiyah Jurisprudence, and Sufism. However, this unity of 
Islamic conception was challenged by the introduction of the Salafia/
Wahabiyah and the Muslim Brotherhood in the 1960s. Both persua-
sions interacted with the traditional conception of Islam differently. 
For instance, Salafiyah considered Sufism a deviant sect from the 
proper understanding of Islam and labeled most of their rituals as 
bid’a and apostasy. On the other hand, Muslim Brotherhood tolerates 
Sufi Orders and Salafiyah and interacts with them positively to fulfill 
their primary objective of preserving Muslim unity. Moreover, Sufi 
Orders began to transform after the collapse of the state in 1991. This 
reform took two forms: Militancy and civil society option. Ahlu-Sunna 
Wa al-Jama represents Sufi militancy, while Moalim Noor Foundation 
represents the civil society option. As a result, all persuasions of Islam, 
except al-Shabab/ Daish, moderated their views, and their consensus 
while controversy among them is narrowing.
Table 2. Typology of Islamic persuasions and their conceptions and relations
Islamic 
Persuasion
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